Honest Company has raised $503 million dollars to date, and has been valued at as high as $1.7 billion. Though valuation fell since 2015 and now likely rests well below $750 million, the company will likely do a few hundred million dollars in sales this year after making $250 million in 2016.

Harry’s has raised $475 million to date, and is valued at $1.7 billion. It will also likely do a few hundred million in sales this year, as the last public numbers put it at a projected $200 million in 2016.

Bonobos, the trailblazer of the digitally-native bunch—and one of the few to actually exit and return money to investors—raised $120 million before selling to Walmart in 2017 for $300 million. It had just over $100 million in revenue at the time of the acquisition—not the big win everyone was hoping for.

Since then, acquisition costs have only increased, pushing brands further into retail and wholesale. Harry’s now has a big business with Walmart and Target, and Honest Company is currently in 17,000 wholesale doors with plans to be in 35,000 in the coming years. It also sells through Target, Amazon, Ulta and many other third-party retailers.

As heavily-funded brands, Honest and Harry’s were once thought to be the new guard of digitally-native retail, along with many other companies that have attracted hundreds of millions of dollars of venture capital. But what has become of these brands and this money? Many have needed to take down rounds, clearing out investors’ potential returns, lowering valuations and laying off employees, in addition to seeking out other remedies meant to correct for overfunding and underselling.

One could argue that part of the reason behind this drought is that no one is buying these brands—but this is because few of them are actually worth what they are valued. The deals that are reached (Seventh Generation, RXBAR, etc.) happen because there is money to be made for everyone involved, including the acquiring company. But when everything is already fully or overly “priced,” activity slows.

There are few signs that this landscape will change anytime soon, especially as long as brands keep raising money at high valuations—and because the growth levers (namely Facebook and Instagram ads) that made so many of them feasible early on now provide a fraction of the productivity they used to.

Perhaps these companies are the best lesson for how to navigate the industry today, since they have had to alter their business models numerous times as changes reverberate throughout the landscape. Honest started as a subscription service, then pivoted to direct-to-consumer, and later to direct and wholesale—most recently, full-blown wholesale drives the business. Harry’s began as a direct-to-consumer subscription, then pivoted more into wholesale, and is now trying to be a holding company for direct-to-consumer brands, even as it shifts even more to wholesale. These brands have scars that are large and visible, but few seem to pay attention, forced to grow as they raise more money.

In turn, these businesses—which could have been appealing acquisitions—are boxing themselves in, preventing mergers. Capital has flowed in, but it has yet to flow out and for most of these brands, it might never happen in any significant form. But even if these brands lack reflection, companies getting built today can glean plenty of lessons.