There are close to 200 brands vying for consumer attention with a high-ticket but infrequent purchase: mattresses. Casper, the most famous, has raised $240 million in funding and did an estimated $350-425 million in revenue in 2018. But now the already crowded market has a new contender.

Last week, Parachute Home, a digitally-native, direct-to-consumer home brand founded in 2013, announced it was launching its first mattress. Based on the dynamics of the space, this move is either a very smart decision or a very unwise one, and yet Casper and Parachute’s diverging approaches say a lot about how brands are seeking further growth in the digitally-native landscape.

Founded in 2014, Casper came out of the single-product cannon, using its debut mattress as a beachhead for its first two years to achieve mindshare and scale. Casper embraced a strategy in which it screamed about a single mattress product to gain resonance, blanketing both the web and cityscapes with endless advertisements, despite the skyrocketing cost of digital advertising. Although these expenditures were not the most efficient use of capital when compared to its resulting revenue, they went a long way toward changing consumer opinion about buying mattresses online. Total mattress sales amounted to nearly $200 million in 2016.

After two years of selling one product, Casper expanded its product assortment—first, to more mattress SKUs and then slowly into bedding accessories and furniture. But despite its additions, Casper only has 13 SKUs as of this writing, and has a ways to go if it wants to accomplish the “lifestyle brand” status hinted at by its co-founder.

Though Casper is now well-known, some may argue that its single-product strategy backfired, not only because of its high advertising cost, but also because the brand is now pigeonholed as a mattress company as it attempts—and arguably, has—to expand to a broader product assortment.

Parachute, on the other hand, spent its first five years selling home textiles such as bedding (78 SKUs), bath (27 SKUs), baby (9 SKUs), decor (31 SKUs) and even some pet products (1 SKU)—a total of 146 SKUs at the time of writing. For a direct-to-consumer brand, this wide assortment speaks to Parachute’s early ambitions to become a lifestyle brand, rather than a single product company. But this swathe of SKUs also underscores that Parachute needs to continue growing its offering to keep customers coming back.

The company raised just under $15 million up until summer 2018, and soon after brought in a $30 million growth equity round, likely backing the brand’s continued marketing efforts, brick-and-mortar expansion and entrance into the mattress space. Parachute’s mattress is two times the price of Casper’s most well-known model, but is slightly cheaper than Casper’s high-end Wave mattress.

While Casper used the mattress as a springboard to enter other categories, Parachute’s theory is that its other products can help it gain a foothold to selling mattresses—that since it is already a household name for its customers, they will be predisposed to pick a Parachute mattress versus looking at a competitor’s product. This strategy also creates a wide set of entry points into the brand, aligning with the more recent lifestyle cannon and the reality that consumers will be comfortable with different price points, of which Parachute offers a range. Because Parachute began a dialogue with customers long ago about its brand and sold them lower-priced SKUs, it will be able to spend less money marketing the mattress—it has tens of thousands of customer emails, addresses and social media info—and can use these pre-established relationships to promote the most expensive product it has ever sold.

Parachute did an estimated $40-65 million in 2018 revenue—a fraction of Casper’s. Additionally, in its first three years, Casper raised about $72 million and generated $200 million in revenue, while Parachute raised about $15 million and earned only an estimated $30 million in revenue. This puts Casper at a 2.77 revenue:capital ratio, and Parachute at an estimated 2.0 ratio. Even though Casper raised much more money, it was able to put more of it to work to drive topline revenue on a dollar-for-dollar basis.

Longevity matters more than the short-term race, especially if both Parachute and Casper are aiming for the same end goal: becoming a lifestyle brand. Parachute is far from being a U.S. household name in any of the categories it sells in. But so far this strategy has positioned Parachute to grow more slowly—yet live longer—than Casper, even though it will be important to watch how Parachute’s most recent funding round changes the pace (and expectations) for growth.

On the other hand, Casper has been trying to sell and find its shareholders liquidity for over a year and a half, a stark reminder of the strings that come with raising so much money. While the mattress category is saturated, Parachute can use it as a lever to grow parts of its diversified business, while Casper needs its mattresses to drive its entire operation. That’s a lot of added pressure, and maybe Parachute isn’t so crazy after all.